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This paper investigates the effect of qualified foreign insti-
tutional investors (QFIIs) on corporate social responsibility
(CSR)within the context of listed firms inChina.We find that
QFIIs offer an incisive channel for improving socially respon-
sible practices. In addition, we find that firms with QFIIs are
more likely to comply with the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) guidelines, and that their sustainability reports tend
to be longer. We also find that this positive effect is more
pronounced in firms with low initial CSR scores than those
with high CSR scores at the time when QFIIs enter the sam-
ple. Our empirical evidence further confirms that this posi-
tive impact is driven byQFIIs from countries with high social
awareness, or QFIIs from geographically distant countries,
consistent with their motives, and is linked to the ownership
ofQFIIs, especiallywhen theQFII is among the top ten of the
largest shareholders. Finally, our extended analysis reveals
that the increase in CSR performance associated with the
presence of QFIIs results in greater firm performance and
easier access to finance.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Opening domestic capital markets to foreign investors is generally considered as one of the most critical business
strategies, especially for emerging economies, in propelling integration of global capital markets, and it has attracted
greater attention fromacademics andpolicymakers in recent years. The literature on the influenceof foreign investors
largely finds that these offshore owners play an important role in shaping business strategies by bringing in better
corporate governance, advanced managerial skills, and enhanced monitoring mechanisms (Huang & Zhu, 2015). For
example, foreign ownership is found in associationwith the increase in firms’ R&Dexpenditures (Huang& Shiu, 2009).
Firms with foreign institutional investors can enhance technological innovation (Luong, Moshirian, Nguyen, Tian, &
Zhang, 2017), improve earnings quality and transparency (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, & Cosset, 2015; Beuselinck, Blanco, &
García Lara, 2017), achieve higher financial performance and value enhancement (Douma,George, &Kabir, 2006), and
foster better stock price informativeness (He, Li, Shen, & Zhang, 2013). Jeon, Lee, and Moffett (2011) document that
foreign investors with substantial shareholdings exert influence on corporate dividend policy. Recent years have also
seen the capital market benefits that firms derive from the presence of foreign institutional investors (Douma et al.,
2006; Schuppli & Bohl, 2010).
Motivated by this strand of the literature, in this studywe examine how foreign investorsmay promote the practice
of corporate social responsibility (CSR), a crucial issue yet to be explored. CSR is corporate environmental and social
conduct that goesbeyond the regulatoryor legal rules facedby the firm (Boubakri, ElGhoul,Wang,Guedhami,&Kwok,
2016), and it has attracted considerable attention in recent years.1 The effective use of CSR strategies can, to some
extent, provide valuable product market differentiation, insure against event risk, and gain capital market benefits,
perceived as ‘doing well by doing good’ (Deng, Kang, & Low, 2013; Dyck, Lins, Roth, &Wagner, 2019; Ferrell, Liang, &
Renneboog, 2016). Stakeholder-oriented activities, such as contributions to employee benefits and compliance with
local regulations of drainage, water pollution, and sulphur dioxide emissions, have propelled various stakeholders to
support corporate business; this, in turn, has produced a positive effect on shareholder value (Ferrell et al., 2016).
Our research setting is based inChina,whichprovides an ideal andunique laboratory to study firm-levelCSRstrate-
gies in the presence of foreign investors, for two reasons. First, China is the largest emerging economywithweak envi-
ronmental and minority shareholder protection. As a socialist country, its CSR performance is among the lowest of
all global economies.2 In recent decades, China has made significant economic progress and successfully transformed
its industrial structure. However, such a remarkable ‘industrial upgrade’ has been achieved at social and environmen-
tal costs, such as air pollution and poor food quality, that have exerted adverse impacts on the society (Elmagrhi, Ntim,
Elamer, &Zhang, 2019). Although the authorities have taken a series of actions in very recent years in addressing prob-
lemswith regard to environmental governance, regulations andmanagement, in response to ever-increasing demands
1 For example, according to a study conducted by KPMG in 2017 on sustainability reporting, around 93% of the top 250 firms on the Global 500 ranking
list published by Fortune undertake environmental, social and governance reporting. For further details see https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/
2017/10/kpmg-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2017.pdf.
2 Liang and Renneboog (2017) indicate that firms from socialist countries (e.g., China, the Russian Federation) have the lowest CSR levels and attach less
attention to socially responsible issues than firms from either common-law origins or civil-law nations.
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for firms to engage in better CSR, the social and environmental issues are still prevalent, mainly due to weak law
enforcement (Elmagrhi et al., 2019). Second, the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) Scheme launched by
the government in 2002 has attracted a large number of foreign institutional investors, especially those from devel-
oped markets, to listed firms in China. The QFII Scheme allows foreign owners to gain access to the domestic capital
market, and theseoffshore investors are expected toplay anessential role in corporatedecisions andgovernanceprac-
tices. For example, Huang and Zhu (2015) state that the role of QFIIs in promoting Chinese governance is significant
with regard to split-share structure reform. Prior studies show that the foreign parties investing in emerging markets
can potentially enhance the information environment in associationwith an increase in analyst coverage and a decline
in earnings management, resulting in enhanced firm innovation (Lel, 2019; Luong et al., 2017). Given the important
role of QFIIs in China, assessing the extent to which foreign investors influence social responsibility provides new
and critical insights that may link changes in business strategy with the push towards effective CSR engagement and
commitment.
McGuinness, Vieito, and Wang (2017) explore the role of foreign ownership, as one of their research questions,
on social ratings in China, and report the absence of a significant positive impact of foreign investors on CSR perfor-
mance.3 With an extended sample period, our study builds upon and goes beyond McGuinness et al. (2017) in order
to fill this important research gap in the CSR literature. Based on a sample of 752 listed firms with 4,145 firm-year
observations and QFIIs covering 22 countries during the period 2009–17, we provide evidence that the presence of
foreign institutional investors has a positive effect onCSR policies, and this positive impact is economically significant,
suggesting that CSR performance, on average, is approximately 4.28% higher for firms with QFIIs than those without
QFIIs, ceteris paribus. In addition, our results reveal that firms with foreign institutional investors are more likely to
comply with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines, and their reports on sustainability tend to be longer and
more comprehensive. Additionally, we find that such a positive effect is more pronounced in firms with low initial CSR
performance than those with high initial CSR performance, suggesting that the scope of the impact depends on initial
CSR performance at the time when QFIIs enter the sample. Our finding is robust to several additional tests, including
the Granger causality test, a firm fixed-effect model, and a weighted least squares approach, and controlling for addi-
tional effects of cross-listing, R&D intensity, excess cash, and a sub-sample excluding firms in themanufacturing sector.
More importantly, our result holds after endogeneity concerns are carefully addressed, based on alternative research
designs, such as the propensity scorematching (PSM) and the Heckman two-stage selection analysis.
Next, we investigate why QFIIs push firms towards better CSR practices. The incentive for QFIIs to promote CSR
initiativesmay be attributable to their high level of social awareness due to the fact that approximately 90%of foreign
investors in Chinese listed firms are from developed economies or well-governed regimes, such as countries in North
America and Western and Northern Europe, where CSR engagement is seen as desirable. When investing in foreign
markets, these offshore owners are highly likely to transplant their social awareness to the firms that they invest in
and pay particular attention to environmental and social issues. In addition, investing in a foreign country is associated
with a unique risk due to the nature of these investments in foreign markets, such as a lack of adequate and transpar-
ent information for rationally assessing their target firms, and foreign investors are often assumed to have an infor-
mation disadvantage relative to domestic investors (Barmeyer &Mayrhofer, 2008; Gehrig, 1993). Under such circum-
stances, promoting socially responsible activities may thus be considered as a way to address such concerns. Indeed,
CSR engagement is generally viewed as an important signalling mechanism that reduces the information asymmetry
(Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2014; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011). Consistently, our results reveal that this positive
impact stems from two channels. In particular, we find that this positive impact is more pronounced in firms with for-
eign investors from countries with high regulatory quality than those from countries with low regulatory quality, and
in firms with foreign investors from geographically remote countries than those from physically proximate nations.
3 Basedon the sample covering theperiod2009–13,McGuinness,Vieito, andWang (2017) indicate theabsenceof significant positive effect of foreignparties,
including both QFIIs and Overseas, on social ratings (see p. 86). In particular, their results presented in tables 3–5 show that the impact of QFIIs on CSR is
negative, althoughmarginally significant.
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Wenext pindown themechanism for suchapositive impact. The literature suggests that large andkey shareholders
can exert influence on corporate policies through proposing and voting, or by appointing directors on the board or
shareholder activism (Lee& Lounsbury, 2011;Oh, Chang, &Martynov, 2011). Using percentage of ownership byQFIIs
to capture the degree of influence, andwhether aQFII is among the top ten shareholders as ameasure for the strength
of influence, we provide evidence suggesting that CSR performance is positively linked to the ownership of QFIIs,
and this positive link is more salient if the QFII is among the top ten shareholders, suggesting that the mechanism
through which QFIIs influence CSR is from the voting power, especially by appointing a director on the management
team. Overall, our results convey that foreign investors, when their investment stakes are significant, have a greater
influential scope on corporate decision making and offer a key channel that links the changing business strategy that
pushes towards effective CSR engagement and commitment. Finally, our extended study reveals that the enhanced
CSR performance driven by the presence of foreign institutional investors leads to real consequences on business
strategies in terms of greater operating performance and easier access to finance.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study adds insights to the general literature on
the determinants of CSR. Prior research has documented that CSR strategies are influenced by academic directors
(Cho, Jung, Kwak, Lee, & Yoo, 2017), cross-listing (Boubakri et al., 2016), CEOmarital status (Hegde &Mishra, 2019),
regulatory and legal systems (Liang & Renneboog, 2017), and board gender diversity (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010;
Elmagrhi et al., 2019; McGuinness et al., 2017). Our study highlights the importance of foreign investors, especially
their social awareness andgeographical distance, as a critical channel topromotebetter social practices for firms listed
in countries, such as China, with weak institutional environments.
Second, this paper provides new evidence to the ever-growing literature on the role of foreign institutional
investors. Prior studies exploring the effects of foreign ownership mainly focus on corporate governance (Huang &
Zhu, 2015), firm performance (Douma et al., 2006), accounting quality (Beuselinck et al., 2017), and the integration of
human and financial resources (Huang & Shiu, 2009). This study enriches the literature on the stakeholder-oriented
implications of foreign ownership and highlights the importance of foreign investors in deploying social-engagement
activities in the Chinesemarket.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature and develop hypotheses, with the research
design presented in Section 3. Section 4 includes a discussion of themain findings, robustness checks, and endogeneity
tests. In Sections 5 and 6we explore themotives for QFIIs in adopting better CSR practices and reveal themechanism
for such an impact. Section 7 provides further analysis, and Section 8 concludes.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Background
The QFII scheme launched by the authorities in 2002 is one of the most important open-door policies in the Chi-
nese equity market. Based on this scheme, foreign institutional investors are allowed to invest directly in the RMB-
denominated capital market. The motive of introducing foreign investors to the Chinese domestic market is generally
considered twofold. First, the Chinese market, as a relative latecomer to global capital markets, attempts to rely on
foreign institutional investors to effectively integrate human capital and financial resources, in addition to introducing
superior management skills and governance practices. Second, the QFII scheme is expected to suppress the impact of
overseas speculative ‘hot money’ on the domestic economy, in building up an open, competitive, and orderly modern
market system (Huang & Zhu, 2015). Since the launch of this scheme, foreign investors in domestic A-share markets
have increased significantly in terms of investment quota and number ofQFIIs, fromonly oneQFIIwith an initial quota
LI ET AL. 5
of $800million (made byUBSAG, the Swiss investment bank), in July 2003, to 283QFIIswith a total investment quota
of $93 billion, as of 31 July 2017.4
The recent surge in the number of foreign investors in the Chinese domestic market is likely to exert direct influ-
ence on firms’ corporate governance, management culture, and monitoring. For example, a recent paper by Huang
and Zhu (2015) asserts that QFIIs promote minority shareholders’ interest in the split-share structure reform pro-
cess. The underlying premise is that the existence of foreign investors enhances corporate governance in China. Li,
Brockman, and Zurbruegg (2015) provide evidence that cross-listedH-shares traded by foreign investors incorporate
significantly more firm-specific information than their A-share counterparts traded by domestic Chinese investors,
thereby generating cross-listing value benefits and confirming the positive effects of QFIIs on the governance system.
In the literature, however, how corporate social activities are influenced by the presence of QFIIs is largely unex-
plored. China has recently promoted CSR practices, driven by high demand for corporate social awareness in address-
ing environmental and social issues, such as air pollution and food safety. Specifically, China, whose coal energymakes
upapproximately 70%of total global energy consumption, has become the largest carbon-dioxidepolluter in theworld
in recent years (Elmagrhi et al., 2019). Further, the Chinesemilk scandal in 2008 that affectedmore than 300,000 chil-
dren was referred to by the World Health Organisation as one of the most significant food safety incidents in recent
years. Indeed, China has made substantial progress in embracing CSR in the past few years by introducing a series of
localised sustainability reporting guidelines.5 In addition, both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges enacted
the Guidelines on Social Responsibility and Environmental Information Disclosure in 2006 and 2008, respectively, to
strengthen social consciousness and help listed firms achieve broader social objectives. Despite all these efforts, the
environmental protection and social welfare systems, as well as the rules for labour and human rights protection, are
all required to be in accordance with international standards. Thus, we believe that the current study is timely and
important, as the opening of the domestic market to foreign investors, especially those from developed markets, is
likely to have a significant influence on the corporate culture, motivating firms to further embrace CSR activities.
2.2 Related literature and hypothesis development
Corporate social responsibility is broadly defined in the literature as a firm’s commitment to minimising potential
harmful effects of its operations on its stakeholders andmaximising its long-run beneficial impact on society (Boubakri
et al., 2016; Ferrell et al., 2016; Kim, Li, & Li, 2014; Liang &Renneboog, 2017). Although there is a considerable debate
regarding the economic and social desirability of CSR, the recent literature largely focuses on the positive view of
CSR.6 Drawing on stakeholder theory, the positive view of CSR suggests that firms rely on various stakeholders, such
as owners, employees, consumers, and the community aswell as the society at large, to support the business in achiev-
ing long-term strategies, such as reputation, legitimacy, and superior firm performance (Cheung, Kong, Tan, & Wang,
2015; Ferrell et al., 2016). In addition, Siegel and Vitaliano (2007) contend that socially responsible activitiesmay pro-
vide firms with an avenue to differentiate themselves from other firms and signal their ethical behaviours and trust-
worthiness to the capitalmarket,which, in turn, helps firms gain capitalmarket benefits (Denget al., 2013; Ferrell et al.,
2016). In particular, socially responsible firms are found to be more likely to constrain earnings management and to
make responsible operating decisions, thereby maintaining transparency in financial reporting and reducing informa-
tion asymmetries (Kim, Park,&Wier, 2012).What the literature indicates is that foreign investors, as key shareholders,
4 See http://english.sse.com.cn/overseasinvestors/qfii/intro.
5 See Elmagrhi, Ntim, Elamer, and Zhang (2019) for details.
6 A large body of empirical evidence finds that CSR engagement can reduce the cost of capital (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2014; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang,
2011); build the reputation for firms (Brammer & Millington, 2005); reduce firm financial risk (Benlemlih & Girerd-Potin, 2017); and enhance the earnings
quality (Kim, Park, &Wier, 2012), investment efficiency and innovation (Benlemlih & Bitar, 2018; Cook, Romi, Sánchez, & Sánchez, 2019), and financial per-
formance (Ferrell, Liang, & Renneboog, 2016; Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017; Renneboog & Liang, 2017).
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should have a strong incentive to promote socially responsible activities, which are inevitably beneficial for business
in the long run.
Compared to the domestic investors whose demands for CSR aremotivated by financial returns, foreign investors’
requests for strong CSR activities may reflect two additional aspects. First, CSR practices have been well adopted
for several decades in well-governed economies. When investing in markets with weakly governed institutional envi-
ronments, such as China, these offshore owners may show similar behaviours and exert direct influence on the man-
agement team; for example, transplanting their high social awareness to the firms that they invest in. Second, invest-
ing in a foreign country is associated with additional risk due to cultural differences and geographical distances, and
foreign investors are often assumed to have an information disadvantage relative to domestic investors (Barmeyer &
Mayrhofer, 2008; Gehrig, 1993). Under such circumstances, foreign partiesmay paymore attention to social and envi-
ronmental issues because the role of CSR engagement can be viewed as an essential signallingmechanism in reducing
information asymmetry (Oh et al., 2011). In sum, foreign investors have great incentives in promoting the social con-
duct of listed firms because by doing so, they can share the financial success of the entities they invest in.
Empirical evidence relating to theeffect of foreign investorsonCSR is limited.Cheunget al. (2015) report that there
is a demand for internationalised firms in China to comply with CSR practices, driven by pressure from foreign stake-
holders, in order to maintain contracts and sustain business relationships. Oh et al. (2011) find that the percentage
of foreign ownership is positively associated with CSR performance in the Korean market, consistent with the view
of Chapple and Moon (2005) who document that globalisation enhances firms’ CSR engagement in Asian countries.
Therefore, our first hypothesis is drawn from the discussion above, and is stated formally below:
H1: Firms with the presence of QFIIs exhibit higher CSR performance than those without QFIIs.
Comparedwithmarkets characterised by better social engagement and corporate governance, CSR involvement in
China is still at the initial stage in terms of wide adoption of regulatory guidelines, codes of social conduct and regula-
tions (Husted, 2015; Sethi, Martell, & Demir, 2017). Although environmental conditions and social issues have forced
the government to develop a series of regulations, there is a significant disparity in the adoption of CSR engagement
among the listed firms in China. For example, the range of overall CSR scores in our sample is from 14.14 to 87.95.
When measured at the industry-adjusted level, such divergence is even more pronounced, varying from −24.31 to
49.27, and more than half of the firms in our sample have CSR scores lower than the average industry level. This dis-
parity leads us to contemplate that the scope of the influence fromQFIIsmay depend on the firm’s initial CSR engage-
ment at the timewhen foreign investors place their investments. If foreign institutional investors indeed advocate for
meaningful CSR practices, we should perceive a greater effect in firms with lower CSR performance than those with
higher CSR performance at the timewhen foreign owners entered the sample. Thus, our second hypothesis is formally
stated below:
H2: The impactofQFIIs onCSRperformance ismorepronounced in firmswith lowCSRperformance than those
with high CSR performance at the timewhenQFIIs enter the sample.
3 RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 Sample construction and data sources
The firm-level sample includes all firms incorporated in China and publicly traded on either the Shanghai Stock
Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange with environmental and social ratings between 2009 and 2017. The
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proxies for environmental and social performance are obtained from the RKS rating system,7 which details the con-
tents of CSR-related activities and fully covers Chinese listed firms issuing CSR or sustainability reports (Elmagrhi
et al., 2019; Lau, Lu, & Liang, 2016; Luo, Wang, & Zhang, 2017; Marquis & Qian, 2014; McGuinness et al., 2017). The
CSR performance score ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values corresponding to a better quality of social conduct.
Information on the ownership identities and characteristics—for example, foreign institutional ownership, share-
holdings, and name and headquarters of each foreign institution on listed firms in China—is obtained from the
Wind Financial Terminal. All financial and accounting data are extracted from the China Stock Market & Accounting
Research database.We then combine themeasurement onQFIIswith theCSR data set, plus a set of financial informa-
tion, to form a panel consisting of 4,145 firm-year observations with 752 listed firms andQFIIs covering 22 countries.
3.2 Key variables
The aggregate CSR performance (CSR), a measure of the overall environmental and social performance of a firm in a
given year, represents the quality, effectiveness, and content of Chinese listed firms’ overall CSR activities. The over-
all CSR performance consists of three dimensions, defined under the headings ofMacrocosm, Content, and Technique.
Macrocosm performance evaluates the overall strategy and disclosure channels employed in a firm’s CSR reporting.
Content, the most important dimension, measures a firm’s effectiveness of the implemented environmental strategy,
economic performance, labour and human rights protection, and community participation. Technique measures the
extent, coverage, and consistency of social reporting.8
In addition to raw CSR ratings, we adopt several alternative measurements as proxies for the quality of socially
responsible activities. First, we consider whether a firm adopts the GRI guidelines, which is measured as a dummy
variable with a value equal to 1 if a firm voluntarily discloses sustainability or CSR reports following the GRI report-
ing standards, and 0 otherwise. The GRI guidelines are viewed by communities and regulatory authorities all over
the world as a way to communicate firms’ impact on important environmental and social issues such as environmen-
tal protection, resource depletion, carbon emissions, climate change, and social well-being (Marquis & Qian, 2014).
Therefore, compliance with the widely accepted GRI standards is generally recognised as acting environmentally and
socially responsible, as the GRI guidelines are deeply rooted in the public interest (Levy, Szejnwald Brown, & De Jong,
2010).
Next, we employ the length of environmental and social reports (Page), defined as the number of pages of the firms’
CSR report in natural logarithm, as an additional measurement of CSR. In disclosing overall CSR ratings, some firms
choose to state such information in their annual financial reports or sustainability reports, and others are more likely
to have stand-alone CSR reports with better readability and more reporting contents in order to demonstrate their
special commitment and efforts to improve transparency regarding the risk management process and performance in
the long run. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) contend that investors require a lower rate of return for firms whose stand-alone
CSR or sustainability reports are more comprehensive and detailed. Finally, we utilise industry-adjusted CSR perfor-
mance to evaluate firms’ environmentally and socially friendly investments relative to their peers in the same sector,
as CSR scores vary considerably across industries. The industry-adjusted CSR (CSR_IA) is measured as the deduction
of the overall CSR rating of a firm from themean rating for all listed firms in the same industry for a given year.9
Qualified foreign institutional investors, indicated by QFII, is the variable of interest in this study, and is measured
as a dummy variable with a value equal to 1 if a firm has foreign institutional investors, and 0 otherwise.
7 The RKS rating system, developed by an independent and leading rating agency in China, follows the evaluating system of the MSCI ESG STATS database
(formerly known asKLD) and standards ofGRI activity (GRI3.0) to construct its own rating system. It provides a comprehensivemeasure that reflects theCSR
practices of a firm.More information is available at http://www.rksratings.cn/.
8 The detailed description of CSR rating composition is presented in Appendix A.
9 The industry classification follows the 2012 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) industry categories.
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3.3 Model specification
To investigate the relationship between QFIIs and CSR performance, we specify the following regression model with
fixed effects following Boubakri et al. (2016), McGuinness et al. (2017), and Dyck et al. (2019):
CSRi,t = 𝛼 + 𝛽1QFIIi,t−1 + 𝛽2Controli,t−1 + Dyear + Dindustry + 𝜀i,t (1)
whereCSR represents theCSRperformance rating;QFII stands for qualified foreign institutional investors; andControl
is a vector of variables that may have potential effects on CSR performance. Specifically, the variables used to control
for the effects of firm-level characteristics are state ownership (State), firm size (Size), firm age (Age), leverage ratio
(Lev), return on assets (ROA), Tobin’sQ (Q), free cash flow (FCF), and ownership concentration (HERF10). In accordance
withMcGuinness et al. (2017) that better governance and larger managerial size are instrumental in promoting effec-
tive CSR activities, we include in our model specification a set of corporate governance variables, including the total
number of directors onboard (BoardSize); CEO-Chairmanduality (Duality); the percentageof independent directors on
board (Indep); and the managerial size (Managerial), defined as the natural logarithm of the total number of executive
managers. A dummyvariable, SSE, is added to differentiate the effect of regulatory guidelines from stock exchanges on
social practices.Dyear andDindustry are year and industry dummies, respectively, to capture time effects and control for
unobserved heterogeneity across industries. We follow Boubakri et al. (2016) and cluster standard errors at the firm
and year level. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year to control for pre-QFII effects, and all continuous vari-
ables arewinsorised at the 1st and99th percentiles of their respective distribution to remove the influence of outliers.
The variable construction is shown in Appendix B.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents the distribution of foreign institutional investors by year and industry during the sample period. As
shown in Panel A, the number of foreign parties increased to 135 in 2017, up from 85 in 2009. In addition, among all
QFIIs, 46.3% are domiciled in countries with high regulatory quality, and the remainder in countries with low regu-
latory regimes. As far as the geographical distance is concerned, 48.4% of QFIIs are from remote countries, and the
rest are from physically close economies, measured by foreign investors’ geographical distances to the capital city of
China. As indicated in Panel B, which further displays the industry distribution of foreign investors, among 924 QFIIs,
567 (61.4%) are clustered in the manufacturing sector, the highest number observed in the single industry among all
other sectors.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics. It shows that the overall CSR performance ratings vary considerably, rang-
ing from 14.14 to 87.95, with a mean (median) value of 38.99 (36.32) and a standard deviation of 12.19, comparable
toMcGuinness et al. (2017) and Elmagrhi et al. (2019). The mean (median) value of the industry-adjusted CSR perfor-
mance (CSR_IA) is 0.21 (−2.48), which varies from −24.31 to 49.27, indicating that more than 50% of the firms in the
sample have industry-adjusted CSR performance lower than the average level. The mean value for foreign investors
(QFII) is 0.131. Therefore, around 13.1% of the firms have qualified foreign institutional investors during the sample
period.
Table 3 presents correlations of the main variables. It is evident that the correlation coefficient between QFII and
CSR is positive and significant. This lends support to the initial finding of the positive influence of foreign investors on
CSR performance. None of the other variables are highly correlated, ruling out potential multicollinearity.
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TABLE 1 Distribution of foreign institutional investors
Panel A: QFIIs distribution by country-level regulatory quality and geographical distance
Regulatory quality Geographical distance
No. of QFIIs High Low Distant Close
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2009 85 41 44 41 44
2010 99 36 63 54 45
2011 96 46 50 50 46
2012 74 26 48 50 24
2013 92 39 53 50 42
2014 119 60 59 59 60
2015 127 65 62 41 86
2016 97 47 50 49 48
2017 135 68 67 53 82
Total 924 428 496 447 477
Panel B: QFIIs distribution by industry
Industries No. of QFIIs
Agriculture, forestry, livestock farming, and fishery (A) 11
Mining (B) 37
Manufacturing (C) 567
Electricity, gas andwater production, and supply (D) 41
Construction (E) 54
Wholesale and retail trade (F) 37
Transportation, warehousing, and postal service (G) 87
Hotel and catering (H) 0
Information transmission, software and information
technology service (I)
36
Real estate (K) 26
Leasing and commerce service (L) 10
Scientific research and technology service (M) 0
Water conservancy, environment and public facilities
management (N)
3
Health and social work (Q) 0
Culture, sports, and entertainment (R) 10
Miscellaneous industries (S) 5
Total 924
Notes: We obtain the country-level regulatory quality scores from the World Bank and calculate the median value for each
year. If a QFII is domiciled in a country with a regulatory quality score equal to or above the median value in a given year, it
is classified as high regulatory quality, otherwise, low regulatory quality. Similarly, we calculate the median value of the geo-
graphical distances between the capital cities of QFIIs’ countries of domicile and the capital city of China, and divide QFIIs
into those from remote-distance countries (equal to or above-median physical distance) and near-distance countries (below-
median physical distance).





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14 LI ET AL.
4.2 Main regression results
To explore the impact of foreign institutional investors on CSR, we estimate equation (1) and report the results in
Panel A of Table 4. Model 1 is our baseline model, where the dependent variable is CSR score. Notably, the coefficient
onQFII is positive and statistically significant (t= 3.26), suggesting that firmswithQFIIs experience an increase in CSR
performance relative to those without QFIIs.10 Importantly, this positive effect is economically significant, indicat-
ing that CSR performance is, on average, approximately 4.28% higher for firms with QFIIs than those without, ceteris
paribus.11 Therefore, the evidence supports hypothesis H1.
The effects of control variables on CSR performance, if significant, are all broadly consistent with previous evi-
dence in the literature. Specifically, CSR performance is positively associated with firm size, Tobin’s Q, free cash flow,
ownership concentration, size of board, and managerial size, and negatively related to firm age, leverage, return on
assets, CEO-Chairman duality, and SSE. It is worth noting that the coefficient on State is not significant, suggesting
that the government is not a significant factor in promoting CSR performance. Our study is consistent with Cheung
et al. (2015), who suggest that state-owned enterprises are not particularly different from non-state-owned firms in
responding to pressure on CSR activities.
As to other alternative measures for a firm’s environmentally and socially friendly behaviour, the dependent vari-
able isGRI inModel 2, estimated using a panel probitmodel, and Page inModel 3. In both specifications, the coefficient
on QFII is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms with QFIIs are more likely to issue sustainability
reports following the GRI guidelines, and have a potential effect on the details and contents of environmental and
social reporting relative to firms without QFIIs. Finally, using the industry-adjusted CSR performance (CSR_IA) as an
explanatory variable shown inModel 4, it further confirms the positive impact of QFIIs on CSR performance. Overall,
using a wide range of alternative measures of CSR, the evidences reaffirm that the presence of QFIIs pushes firms to
adopt better CSR engagement.
Note that in allmodel specifications shown inTable4,Age is negative and statistically significant.12 The result seems
to be in contrast to the argument that young firmsmay not have sufficient resources to invest in CSRor environmental
protection activities, predicting a positive link between firm age andCSRexists (Boubakri et al., 2016;Withisuphakorn
& Jiraporn, 2016). However, in a highly competitive environment as seen in China, young or start-up firmsmay have an
incentive to actively engage in CSR as an instrument to establish a good reputation, consistent with the perspectives
of Brammer and Pavelin (2006), in order to compete with mature firms for bank loans and market participants. For
example, Wens Foodstuff Group (stock code: 300498), the firm listed on the ChiNext of Shenzhen Stock Exchange
in 2015, is a relatively young firm, but its total social welfare donations and environmental protection investments
amounted to approximately 100.55 and 157.10million USD in 2016 and 2017, respectively.13
Next, to further explore the extent to which QFIIs influence CSR performance, we divide the sample into high and
low CSR firms at the time when QFIIs make their investments. In doing so, we first calculate the median value of CSR
performance for each year and then, based on this, categorise a firm into a higher CSR group if its initial CSR score in a
given year is above or equal to themedian CSR level, and a lower CSR group, if otherwise.We then re-run equation (1)
separately for each subsample and report the results in Table 4, Panel B. It shows that the coefficient onQFII is positive
for both groups, and it is highly significant in firms with low initial CSR. Consistent with hypothesis H2, our result
indicates that the effect of QFIIs is more pronounced in firms with low initial CSR performance than those with high
10 We also use CSR scores in natural logarithm as an alternative measurement, and the result is unaffected. In addition, we investigate the impact of QFIIs
on CSR dimensions, and our results show that firms with QFIIs promote all three categories including Macrocosm, Content, and Technique performance. All
results are available upon request.
11 InModel 1, the coefficient onQFII is 1.67, and the average CSR performance is 38.99, as reported in Table 2, which together indicate that the CSR perfor-
mance for firms with QFIIs is expected to increase by an average of approximately 4.28% (e.g., 38.99+ 1.67= 40.66).
12 In an unreported analysis, we run bivariate regression between CSR and Age and the result indicates that the relationship between these two variables is
indeed negative.
13 Further details are available at https://www.wens.com.cn/cn/shzr/index_8.aspx.
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TABLE 4 The impact of QFIIs on CSR performance
Panel A: The effects of QFIIs on CSR performance and reporting
CSR GRI Page CSR_IA








QFII 1.6743*** 0.0399*** 0.1188*** 1.6809***
(3.2551) (2.9484) (2.7956) (3.2598)
State 0.6715 0.0522 −0.0653 0.2547
(0.5532) (1.5258) (−0.5487) (0.2108)
Size 4.1327*** 0.0815*** 0.2746*** 4.1334***
(22.6012) (16.6599) (19.4067) (22.6706)
Age −1.6542*** −0.0192** −0.1226*** −1.6237***
(−5.6633) (−2.1482) (−4.8922) (−5.5918)
Lev −6.1949*** −0.1558*** −0.2947*** −6.1556***
(−5.6130) (−4.0763) (−3.0996) (−5.5941)
ROA −7.0527** −0.2463** −0.2254 −8.2762**
(−2.1297) (−2.1001) (−0.7776) (−2.4958)
Q 0.6753*** 0.0065 0.0589*** 0.6785***
(4.7917) (1.2013) (4.4049) (4.7959)
FCF 1.8821** −0.0037 0.0269 1.8259**
(2.0352) (−0.1046) (0.3149) (1.9696)
HERF10 8.2822*** 0.0650 0.5212*** 8.2164***
(5.2575) (1.3461) (4.0421) (5.2313)
BoardSize 3.1696*** 0.0864*** 0.2032*** 3.1288***
(3.5068) (3.3874) (2.7802) (3.4896)
Duality −0.8945** 0.0398*** −0.0615* −0.9135**
(−2.2318) (2.6314) (−1.7152) (−2.2775)
Indep 0.1474 0.1348 0.0836 0.2109
(0.0506) (1.4167) (0.3286) (0.0727)
Managerial 3.5613*** 0.0381*** 0.2474*** 3.4794***
(7.7621) (2.7741) (6.6166) (7.6074)
SSE −2.1040*** −0.0474*** −0.1970*** −2.1195***
(−6.3496) (−4.2256) (−6.9054) (−6.3994)
_cons −73.6510*** 0.1588*** −4.5431*** −99.9656***
(−17.6064) (31.7617) (−13.4128) (−23.9449)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 4,145 4,147 2,929 4,145
Adj./Pseudo R-square 0.350 0.217 0.263 0.255
(Continues)
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TABLE 4 (Continued)











Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of obs. 1,887 2,258
Adj. R-square 0.332 0.293
Strong versus weak initial CSR (p-value) (0.0363)
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the impact of QFIIs on firms’ CSR performance and reporting activi-
ties. In Panel A, the dependent variable is overall CSR performance (CSR) inModel (1), the compliancewith the Global Report-
ing Initiative (GRI) in Model (2), the natural logarithm of the length of CSR reports (Page) in Model (3), and the industry-year-
adjusted CSR performance (CSR_IA) in Model (4). In addition, marginal effects are reported in Model (2). Panel B reports the
results by dividing the sample into high and lowCSR firms at the timeQFIIs enter the sample. Variable definitions can be found
inAppendix B. In all specifications, independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and
year level and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics (or
Z-statistics) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
initial CSR. In other words, the influence of foreign institutional investors is more salient in firms with more scope for
CSR improvement. Following Henderson, Kumbhakar, Li, and Parmeter (2015) and Dyck et al. (2019), we find that the
difference between two subsamples is statistically significant (p-value = 0.0363) based on the seemingly unrelated
estimation.
4.3 Robustness tests
In this section, we perform several robustness tests to examine the validity of our main finding by employing the
Granger causality test, a firm fixed-effect approach, and weighted least squares, as well as controlling for additional
effects of cross-listing, R&D intensity, and excess cash, and using a sub-sample excluding the firms in the manufactur-
ing sector.We explain our results based on the baselinemodel for brevity.
4.3.1 Granger causality test
Reverse causality may potentially bias our results because foreign investors may choose to invest in socially respon-
sible firms. For example, Wang and Chen (2017) find that foreign institutional investors tilt their investment in firms
that are doing well at saving energy. To rule out reverse causality as an alternative explanation for our results, we turn
to the Granger causality test by estimating two symmetric sets of regressions (Dyck et al., 2019); that is, we regress
CSR on lagged QFII and lagged CSR, and QFII on lagged CSR and lagged QFII, with the same set of lagged control vari-
ables, separately. The results, displayed in Models 1 and 2 of Table 5, show that the coefficient on QFII is positive and
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































LI ET AL. 19
statistically significant, but that on CSR is not.14 Thus, we conclude that it is the QFIIs that drive firms’ social perfor-
mance, rather than the firmswith highCSRperformance that attract the investments of foreign institutional investors.
4.3.2 Firm fixed-effect approach
In the previous analysis, we control only for observable firm characteristics. Some unobservable factorsmay, however,
drive the results. To mitigate potential concerns that our results may arise from omitting time-invariant firm-specific
factors, we follow Hegde and Mishra (2019) to estimate equation (1) by employing a firm fixed-effect approach. The
result is presented in Model 3. Without a surprise, a positive and statistically significant relationship between QFII
and CSR still exists. The evidence, again, supports our main finding. In unreported analysis, we also adopt alternative
measures of CSR, such as the industry-adjusted CSR performance and the length of CSR reports, and in both cases, we
find that QFIIs have a positive impact on CSRwith the use of the firm fixed-effect model.
4.3.3 Weighted least squares approach
Our sample, an unbalanced panel data set, is unevenly distributed across years. It may be unreasonable to assume that
every firm-year observation should be treated equally, and using a procedure that treats all of the data equally may
provide a less precise estimation on data points since some may be given less influence than they should be, while
others that have little influence are assignedwith heavyweights. Bearing this inmind, we thus introduce theweighted
least squares (WLS) methodology to maximise the efficiency of our parameter estimation. This approach assigns each
data point a proper amount of influence over the parameter estimates. The result is displayed inModel 4 and it shows
that the coefficient onQFII is positive and highly significant, suggesting that firmswithQFIIs exhibit higher CSR scores
when using a weighted regressionmodel as an alternative robustness check.
4.3.4 Additional controls
We further test whether ourmain finding is sensitive to the inclusion of additional controls. First, recent empirical evi-
dence shows that reduced agency problems and better corporate governance are both associated with superior CSR
performance (Harjoto & Jo, 2011). In particular, Boubakri et al. (2016) find that firms cross-listed in multiple stock
exchanges are subject to more rules on disclosure and corporate governance, and tend to have better CSR perfor-
mance than those without cross-listing. To mitigate the concern that omitted variables may drive our results, we con-
trol for the effect of cross-listing on CSR performance by creating a dummy variable, Cross, which equals 1 if a firm
is listed on multiple stock exchanges in a given year and afterwards, and 0 otherwise, and report the result in Model
5. The coefficient on QFII remains positive and statistically significant at the conventional level, supporting our main
finding.
Second, we examine whether a firm’s research and development (R&D) expenditures may affect the firm’s invest-
ment in CSR activities.15 The association between R&D intensity and subsequent CSR scores may go both ways. On
the one hand, firms may choose to allocate fewer resources to CSR-related activities if there is a strong inclination
towards R&D or innovative investments (Pavelin & Porter, 2008). On the other hand, according to the resources-
based view, R&D expenditures and CSR activities may help generate valuable resources and enhance competitive
14 It is worth noting that the Granger causality test may suffer some limitations such as relatively short time series in panel data and a large number of cross-
sectional units indicated by Dyck, Lins, Roth, andWagner (2019).
15 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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advantages, leading to a positive link betweenR&D intensity andCSR (Hegde&Mishra, 2019; Padgett &Galan, 2010).
To account for the potential impact of R&D intensity onCSR,we generate a variable, indicated byRDIntensity andmea-
sured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets in year t− 1, and repeat our analysis controlling for this variable.
The estimate is reported inModel 6where it shows that RDIntensity has a positive and significant effect on CSR activi-
ties, implying that R&D-intensive firms tend to use CSR strategy as ameans to recruit and retain talented people, such
as research specialists and engineers, who can provide firmswith critical intangible resources and capital market ben-
efits, because social responsibility actions can fulfil stakeholder expectations and build a good reputation (Brammer &
Pavelin, 2006). Note that the coefficient on QFII is still positive and statistically significant, suggesting that our main
result is not affected by the inclusion of the R&D variable.
Third, we take firms’ slack resources into account. According to slack resource theory, a firm’s slack resource
availability, such as excess cash balance, may have a positive effect on CSR performance (Waddock & Graves, 1997).
Although in our model specification, as shown in equation (1), variables such as ROA and FCF are included to take firm
performance into account, excess cash accumulated by the firmmay be evenmore important to socially based expen-
diture. FollowingDittmar andMahrt-Smith (2007) and Frésard and Salva (2010), we define excess cash, ExcessCash, as
cash held by firms that is not committed for operations and investment activities scaled by total assets at year t− 1. In
other words, excess cash is measured as the residual from the normal cash regression.16 We repeat our analysis with
inclusion of this variable into ourmodel specification and display the result inModel 7.We find that the coefficient on
excess cash is positive, but statistically insignificant (t=1.54), indicating that slack resources available to the firm have
no direct impact on CSR activities. Notably, however, the coefficient onQFII is still positive and statistically significant,
reaffirming the positive influence ofQFII on CSR ratings despite the inclusion of this additional variable.
Finally, as shown in our sample distribution foreign investors are clustered in the manufacturing sector, consis-
tent with Liu, Bredin, Wang, and Yi (2014) who document that foreign funds are typically keen to invest in certain
industries—for example, the manufacturing sector—as opposed to other sectors, such as real estate, construction,
media and culture that generally need local knowledge. Thus, our result could simply reflect industry effects. Although
the industrial dummy is included in all regressions shown in Table 4 to control for unobserved heterogeneity across
industries, we further rule out such concerns by excluding firms in the manufacturing sector, which reduces our sam-
ple to 1,813 observations. Our result is reported in Model 8. As indicated clearly, the influence of QFIIs on CSR is still
positive and statistically significant, implying that our main finding is not driven by a large number of QFIIs clustered
in themanufacturing sector. It is worth noting that our finding further reveals that QFIIs play amore influential role in
inducing appreciable changes in firms’ CSR performance across broad industry sectors, thanks to the rapid expansion
of theQFII Scheme in recent years.17
In sum,our result is robust toa setof alternative researchapproachesand is insensitive to the inclusionof additional
controls and sub-sample, further confirming that QFIIs play an important role in promoting CSR activities.
4.4 Endogeneity tests
As with all empirical studies in corporate finance, endogeneity is a possible concern. Firms with better environmen-
tal and social performance ratings may attract more foreign institutional investors due to their good reputation built
through CSR activities. It might also be possible that the presence of foreign ownership and socially responsible con-
duct are simultaneously influenced by omitted variables. Further, the differences in observable firm characteristics
between firms with and without QFIIs may result in potential concerns. Although the Granger causality test, as well
16 Please see Dittmar andMahrt-Smith (2007) and Frésard and Salva (2010) for further details.
17 In particular, the initial quota that allowed QFIIs to invest in an individual stock was limited to a maximum of 20% of a firm’s outstanding shares by CSRC.
From10September 2019, such quota is removed by the StateAdministration of Foreign Exchange, indicating that once licensed byCSRC,QFIIs have no limits
in investing in Chinese listed firms. Further details are available at http://m.safe.gov.cn/safe/2019/0910/14035.html.
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as firm-, industry-, and year fixed-effect regressions may, to some extent, mitigate these concerns, they cannot ade-
quately address reverse causality problems and capture unobserved characteristics due to sample selection bias. In
this section, we further address these concerns by adopting alternative research designs, including the propensity
score-matching (PSM)method and the Heckman two-stage selection analysis.
4.4.1 Propensity score-matching approach
Wefirst adopt thepropensity score-matchingmethod to examine the impact of foreign investors onCSRperformance.
With replacement, we match the treatment group with the control group based on a variety of firm characteristics
(Size, Age, Lev, and ROA) as well as the year and industry dummies, and employ the PSM technique with calliper set at
0.01. We identify the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), in which the ‘Treatment’ represents QFII. ATT is
the average difference between the CSR ratings of firms with QFIIs and their counterfactual peers’ CSR ratings. After
matching, a balancing test is carried out to examine whether the mean of each covariate significantly differs from the
treatment to control groups.
A propensity score analysis for treatment firms and non-treatment firms is presented in Panel A of Table 6. In
SectionA, it shows that theCSRperformance of firmswithQFIIs is approximately 1.40 points higher than that of firms
without QFIIs. Section B indicates that the sample is well balanced, as the firm characteristics of the control group are
not statistically different from those of the treatment group in all panels.18
4.4.2 Heckman two-stage estimator
Our sample is constructedbasedonwhether firmsdiscloseCSRor sustainability reports and receiveCSRperformance
scores, whichmay potentially introduce sample selection bias because not all firms disclose their CSR information and
sustainability reports (Kong, Yang, Liu, & Yang, 2020). To alleviate such concerns, we employ theHeckman (1979) two-
step procedure to check whether our result is robust to this selection bias. To perform this test, we first carry out a
probit regression model, as shown in equation (2), to estimate the likelihood that firms issue CSR reports and receive
CSR performance scores, to obtain the InverseMills Ratio (known as Lambda), the self-selection parameter, and in the
second-stage regression, we insert Lambda in themodel specification as shown in equation (3):
Pr(CSRDi,t) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1Mandatoryi,t−1 + 𝛽2Controli,t−1 + Dyear + Dindustry + 𝜀i,t (2)
CSRi,t = 𝛼 + 𝛽1QFIIi,t−1 + 𝛽2Controli,t−1 + 𝛽3Lambdai,t−1 + Dyear + Dindustry + 𝜀i,t (3)
where CSRD is an indicator variable set to 1 if a firm issues a CSR report and receives a CSR rating in a given year, and
0 otherwise.Mandatory is used to measure the probability of whether a sample can be observed, and is defined as a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is mandated to disclose a CSR report in a given year, and 0 otherwise (Chen, Hung,
& Wang, 2018; Kong et al., 2020).19 According to prior research, Mandatory affects firm-level CSR but has no direct
impact on the presence of QFIIs. Control is the same set of control variables included in equation (1) that are known to
have a potential impact on CSR.
18 We also identify the ATTwhen the ‘Treatment’ isQFII_high andQFII_distant, and our finding remains unchanged.
19 Note that firms listed on the SSE Corporate Governance Sector and cross-listed are required to disclose their CSR reports. In addition, firms included in
the Shenzhen 100 Index are required to issue their sustainability reports.
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TABLE 6 Endogeneity tests
Panel A: Propensity scorematching approach
Section A. Average treatment effect on the treated.
ATT (T-stat) TreatedDependent
variable= CSR (mean) (mean) Control No. of obs. Treated: Control
QFII 1.4024** (2.00) 42.2442 40.8418 4,255 581: 3,674
Section B. Univariate balanced test for pairs of treatment and control groups after matching.
Matching criteria Treated (mean) Control (mean) % bias reduction Difference p-value
Size 23.4950 23.4780 96.9 0.0170 0.853
Age 2.4025 2.3967 81.3 0.0058 0.862
Lev 0.4729 0.4743 96.1 −0.0014 0.902
ROA 0.0679 0.0694 94.4 −0.0015 0.697
















Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of obs. 16,785 4,477
Wald test of independent equations Chi2 (p-value) 10.01*** (0.0016)
Wald Chi2 (p-value) 1356.48*** (0.0000)
ρ 0.3963
σ 10.1107
Notes: Panel A reports the results of a propensity score matching (PSM) routine for treatment firms and non-treatment firms
from2009 to 2017.Wematch firms using a propensity scorematching algorithmwith calliper set at 0.01 and an array of firm-
specific characteristics (firm size, firm age, leverage, and ROA). The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), in which
the ‘Treatment’ stands for QFII, is reported in Section A. Section B displays the univariate balanced test for pairs of treatment
and control firms after matching. All matching criteria are all in year t − 1 with year and industry dummies included. Panel
B presents the results based on Heckman two-step regressions. In the first stage, a probit model is adopted to predict the
presence of CSR performance, where a dummy variable, CSRD, set to 1 if a firm issues a CSR report and receives CSR rating
in a given year, and 0 otherwise, is regressed on Mandatory and Control to estimate the Inverse Mills ratio, namely Lambda.
Mandatory is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is mandated to disclose a CSR report in a given year and 0 otherwise. In
the second stage, Lambda is included as an additional independent variable in equation (1). Due to space limitations, this panel
does not display the control variables. In both regressions, independent variables are lagged by one year, with controlling for
industry and year fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Appendix B. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level. T-statistics (or Z-statistics) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Panel B of Table 6 reports the regression results of the Heckman two-stage analysis. In the first-stage regres-
sion, the coefficient on Mandatory is positive and highly significant, indicating that firms subject to the mandatory
CSR reporting policy are more likely to issue their sustainability reports and receive CSR performance ratings. In the
second-stage regressionwith Lambda included, our results show that the coefficient onQFII is positive and statistically
significant (t= 2.92), consistent with our main finding. Themagnitude of the coefficient onQFII (1.43) is slightly lower
than that in Model 1 of Table 4 (1.67), implying that the selection bias slightly amplifies the impact of QFIIs on CSR
performance. More importantly, the positive association between the presence of foreign institutional investors and
CSR performance is unaffected using the Heckman two-stage analysis.20
5 WHY DO QFIIS PUSH FIRMS TOWARDS BETTER CSR PRACTICES?
In this section, we aim to answer the question of whyQFIIs push firms to adopt high CSR practices by looking into two
avenues: social awareness and physical distances ofQFIIs. The former reflects foreign investors’ social awareness, and
the latter may imply an additional degree of information asymmetry that QFIIs may bear.
5.1 The social awareness motive: Regulatory quality of countries
When assessing the positive effect of foreign investors on CSR performance, it is necessary to review QFIIs’ legal
and regulatory quality backgrounds that may reflect their distinctive social preferences. Liang and Renneboog (2017)
assert that countries under different legal regimes handle concerns and conflicts between firms, communities and
other stakeholders differently; regulatory quality and institutional backgrounds can, to a large extent, explain the
variation in the corporate social practices across countries. Dyck et al. (2019) maintain that institutional ownership,
especially those from countries with a strong community belief in the importance of environmental and social (E&S)
issues, is a driving force behind firms’ E&S performance. In addition, according to Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI), institutions in countrieswith strict lawand regulations can effectively enhance the stringencyof environmental
regulations, labour regulations, business regulatory environment, and address various stakeholder concerns in terms
of unfair competitive practices, access to product markets, labour rights, minimum wages, hiring and firing practices,
and price control (Mavragani, Nikolaou, & Tsagarakis, 2016). Furthermore, well-governed countries largely depend
on regulation-based mechanisms that place restrictions on ex-ante behaviours (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer,
2008; Liang & Renneboog, 2017). As a consequence, foreign investors from countries with high regulatory quality are
more likely to exhibit their stronger social preferences, and when they invest in foreign markets they may carry out
their high social behaviour in incorporating environmental and community engagement into firms that they invest in,
thus pushing towards higher CSR behaviours of the firms.
To examine whether foreign investors transplant their social awareness to the firms they invest in, we divide QFIIs
into two groups according to the regulatory quality of countries where they are domiciled. Specifically, we obtain
the country’s regulatory quality scores from the World Bank and calculate the median value for each year.21 We
then generate two dummy variables. QFII_high is assigned with a value of 1 for firms having a foreign investor from a
country with a regulatory quality score equal to or above median value in a given year, and 0 for firms either having
no foreign investors or having foreign parties from a country with a regulatory quality score lower thanmedian value.
Similarly,QFII_low receives a value of 1 for firms having foreign institutional investors from a country with regulatory
20 We have also adopted the Heckman two-stage analysis to address the selection bias concerns with respect to the link between social awareness and
geographical distance of QFIIs and CSR performance by replacing QFIIwith QFII_high and QFII_low, and QFIIwith QFII_distant and QFII_close in equations (2)
and (3), respectively. Ourmain finding continues to hold.
21 The regulatory quality score ranges from−2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to higher levels of regulatory quality. For details, please see https:
//info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents.
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quality score lower than median value, and 0 for firms either having no foreign institutional ownership or having
foreign investors from a regime with regulatory quality score equal to or above median value. In the case of multiple
foreign investors within a firm in a given year, we identify the dominant institution according to the total percentage
of shares held by QFIIs.22 By replacing QFII with QFII_high and QFII_low in equation (1), we obtain the estimates
reported inModel 1 of Table 7. Notably, the coefficient onQFII_high is positive and statistically significant, suggesting
that the positive effect of foreign institutional investors on CSR performance ismostly attributable toQFIIs domiciled
in highly regulated countries where the social awareness and CSR standards are higher than those from countries
with relatively low regulatory quality. Therefore, our results reveal that the legal and regulatory quality background
of QFIIs can be viewed as an essential channel that transplants social standards to the firms that they invest in, and
offshore owners with high social awareness background act as a key driver of the initiative of CSR practices.
5.2 The risk resolution motive: Physical distance of QFIIs
Alternatively, foreign investors’ push forCSRengagementmay stem fromthe ideaof investmentuncertainty reduction
that CSR engagement may bring. Investing in a foreign country is associated with additional uncertainty and higher
levels of risk due to increased information asymmetry (Barmeyer & Mayrhofer, 2008; Gehrig, 1993; Oh et al., 2011).
Specifically, Kang and Kim (2008) find that information asymmetry arising from geographic proximity is a key deter-
minant of domestic large acquirers’ corporate governance practices in their target firms, implying that investors from
geographically distant markets suffer from more severe information asymmetries relative to investors domiciled in
physically close countries. Furthermore, as indicated in Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2008) and Cai, Lee, Xu, and Zeng
(2019), foreign institutional investors are often assumed to exhibit information disadvantages relative to domestic
investorswho have greater local knowledge and access to awider variety of additional information from local sources.
As such, it is plausible to assume that QFIIs pressure managers to promote CSR activities as a way of reducing infor-
mation asymmetry that they bear due to geographical distances, especially those from remote countries, because the
empirical evidence shows that effective use of CSR strategies is negatively associated with information asymmetry
(Cho, Lee, & Pfeiffer, 2013; Cui, Jo, & Na, 2018).
To assess the uncertainty resolution incentive, we follow Kang and Kim (2010) and measure the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry using the natural logarithm of geographical distance between the capital cities of QFIIs’ countries
of domicile and the capital city of China as a proxy. We then divide QFIIs into those from remote-distance countries
(equal or above-median physical distance) and near-distance countries (below-median physical distance). Accordingly,
twodummyvariables are createdwithQFII_distantbeing abinary variable equal to 1 for firmswith foreign institutional
investors from remote-distance countries in a given year, and 0 for firms either without foreign institutional owner-
ship or with foreign investors from near-distance countries in the same year, and similarly QFII_close being a dummy
variable set to 1 for firms that receive foreign investments fromnear-distance countries in a given year, and 0 for firms
either without foreign institutional ownership or with foreign investors domiciled in remote-distance countries in the
same year. The estimate of equation (1) withQFII being replaced byQFII_distant andQFII_close is displayed inModel 2
of Table 7. We find that the coefficients on both dummy variables are positive, and the magnitude of the highly signif-
icant coefficient on QFII_distant (1.83) is higher than that on QFII_close (1.49). Our findings reveal that these offshore
owners, especially from geographically remote distances, play a crucial role in pushing CSR engagement to offset such
22 Taking JianglingMotorsCorporation (stock code: 000550), oneof the largest exporters of light diesel commercial vehicles inChina, as an example, Jiangling
has three foreign institutional investors in 2014, namely, China International Capital Corporation Hong Kong Asset Management Limited, Canada Pension
Plan Investment Board, and Kuwait Investment Authority; these three investors own 1.25%, 1.53% and 1.03% of the shares issued by the firm, respectively.
The regulatory quality scores of Hong Kong (2.06) and Canada (1.85) are higher than themedian level (1.67), thus a high regulatory system, while the regula-
tory quality score of Kuwait (−0.15) is lower than themedian value, thereby a relatively inferior governance system. Therefore, the dominantQFII in Jiangling
is identified as the high-regulatory-quality system because 2.78% is greater than 1.03%.
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TABLE 7 The effects of regulatory quality and geographical distance of QFIIs’ countries on CSR and the




















State 0.7272 0.8818 0.6438 0.8827
(0.5996) (0.7236) (0.5283) (0.7240)
Size 4.0850*** 4.0894*** 4.1914*** 4.0871***
(22.3780) (22.1254) (22.9131) (22.1671)
Age −1.6794*** −1.6339*** −1.6216*** −1.6291***
(−5.7412) (−5.5965) (−5.5453) (−5.5949)
Lev −5.9768*** −6.0720*** −6.4303*** −6.0668***
(−5.4257) (−5.4995) (−5.7852) (−5.4987)
ROA −6.8687** −6.7069** −6.6299** −6.6550**
(−2.0780) (−2.0205) (−2.0000) (−2.0093)
Q 0.6730*** 0.6664*** 0.6829*** 0.6668***
(4.7812) (4.7344) (4.8370) (4.7343)
FCF 1.8046* 1.3535 1.9167** 1.3447
(1.9542) (1.4979) (2.0725) (1.4901)
HERF10 8.1631*** 8.5823*** 8.4856*** 8.5761***
(5.1738) (5.6665) (5.3774) (5.6649)
BoardSize 3.2000*** 3.1494*** 3.1613*** 3.1494***
(3.5546) (3.4906) (3.4950) (3.4872)
Duality −0.8555** −0.8953** −0.9032** −0.8902**
(−2.1314) (−2.2355) (−2.2524) (−2.2231)
Indep 0.1302 0.2098 0.0667 0.2069
(0.0448) (0.0721) (0.0229) (0.0711)
(Continues)






Dependent variable= CSR (1) (2) (3) (4)
Managerial 3.5330*** 3.5567*** 3.5750*** 3.5529***
(7.7290) (7.7373) (7.7876) (7.7287)
SSE −2.1052*** −2.1268*** −2.0674*** −2.1233***
(−6.3472) (−6.4163) (−6.2384) (−6.4022)
_cons −72.6885*** −72.7781*** −74.8456*** −72.7426***
(−17.3516) (−17.2706) (−17.9659) (−17.2611)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 4,145 4,145 4,145 4,145
Adj. R-square 0.352 0.351 0.348 0.351
Notes: This table reports the OLS regression results of the impact of country-level regulatory quality and geographical dis-
tance of QFIIs in Models (1) and (2), and ownership characteristics of QFIIs in Models (3) and (4) on the CSR performance of
firms invested. See Appendix B for detailed variable definitions. In all models, independent variables are lagged by one year.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
additional risk arising from information asymmetry that they bear due to the geographical location from the target
firms.
Together, our findings support that both social awareness and risk resolution are the driving forces for offshore
owners to urge firms that they invest in to propel environmental and social policies.
6 WHAT MECHANISMS DO QFIIS USE TO PUSH FOR HIGH CSR?
The literature suggests that large and key shareholders can exert influence on corporate policies through proposing
and voting, or by appointing directors on the board or shareholder activism (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Oh et al., 2011).
Similarly, if foreign institutional investors own a significant amount of a firm’s shares, they are entitled to vote in the
shareholder meeting (Huang & Zhu, 2015). Building upon this line of literature, we empirically explore themechanism
through which QFIIs push towards CSR. For this purpose, we generate a variable,QFII_own, measured as the percent-
age of ownership held by QFIIs, to capture the effect of foreign investors on CSR performance. The percentage of
ownership represents the significance of QFIIs’ influence and voting power on the management team (Yeo, Tan, Ho, &
Chen, 2002). In addition, we introduce two dummy variables,QFII_Top10 andQFII_nonTop10, to measure the strength
of influence fromQFIIs. If investment stakes are significantly large, QFIIs could assign a director in the boardroom to
directly influence the decision making of the management team. QFII_Top10 (QFII_nonTop10) is equal to 1 if the per-
centage of shareholding by QFIIs is greater than or equal to (less than) that by the 10th largest shareholder of a firm
in a given year, and 0 if either the percentage of shareholding by QFIIs is less than (greater than or equal to) that by
the 10th largest shareholder, or if the firm does not have a QFII in the same year. To test this premise, we estimate
equation (1) by replacingQFIIwithQFII_own, and withQFII_Top10 andQFII_nonTop10, separately. As shown inModels
3 and 4 of Table 7, both coefficients onQFII_own andQFII_Top10 are positive and statistically significant (with t= 1.67
and 2.99, respectively), whereas that on QFII_nonTop10 is insignificant. Collectively, our evidence suggests that when
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investment stakes are significant, foreign investors may have a great scope to push firms towards high CSR engage-
ment through their voting power or by appointing a director.
7 EXTENDED ANALYSIS
As discussed earlier, the presence of foreign investors plays a part in facilitating socially responsible policies and leads
to an improvement in CSR ratings. In this section, we extend this line of analysis by assessing whether the increase
in CSR ratings associated with the presence of QFIIs has real consequences on firms’ business strategies. Prior stud-
ies document that superior CSR performance may have implications on firm performance (Cook, Romi, Sánchez, &
Sánchez, 2019; Gregory, Whittaker, & Yan, 2016; Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017) and access to finance (Cheng, Ioan-
nou, & Serafeim, 2014). Next, we extend the study by exploring the incremental effects of CSR driven by the presence
of foreign institutional investors from these two aspects.
First, we look into the interplay between QFIIs and CSR performance on firm profitability. Prior empirical studies
reveal that socially responsible activities and practices are consistent with value maximisation (Ferrell et al., 2016;
Lins et al., 2017). Indeed, CSR engagement is found to exert a significant effect on corporate strategies motivated by
the economic and social benefits of these philanthropic activities. Grounded on stakeholder theory, the success of
an organisation relies heavily on its ability to develop a mutually respectful and trustful relationship with different
stakeholder groups (Deng et al., 2013). Inspired by these studies, we empirically investigate whether firms with QFIIs
can obtain profit-related benefits from the enhanced CSR performance, by specifically focusing on ROA, ameasure of
a firm’s operating performance as a critical indicator formonitoringmanagers’ earnings capabilities, with the following
specification:
ROAi,t = 𝛼 + 𝛽1QFIIi,t + 𝛽2 QFIIi,t × CSRi,t−1 + 𝛽3CSRi,t−1 + 𝛽4Controli,t−1
+Dyear + Dindustry + 𝜀i,t (4)
whereROA stands for operating performance,measuredas earnings before interest and taxes scaledby thebookvalue
of total assets (Ding, Ferreira, &Wongchoti, 2016). The incremental effect of CSR performance through the presence
of foreign stakeholders on firm profitability is captured by the interaction term between QFII and CSR, which is our
main interest. We expect this effect to be positive according to the prior literature that the enhanced CSR perfor-
mance should lead to better profitability. Following Boubakri et al. (2016) and Wang and Li (2016), Healy, Serafeim,
Srinivasan, and Yu (2014), we control for several factors, including State, Size,MTB, and SalesGrowth that are generally
known to affect corporate profitability.Wepresent the result inModel 1 of Table 8,where it shows that the coefficient
on QFII × CSR is positive, although marginally significant, implying that the increase in CSR performance through the
presence of foreign institutional investors leads to higher operating performance.More importantly for our purposes,
the increase in CSR performance associated with the presence of QFIIs generates capital market benefits, resulting in
greater operating performance.
Second, we examine the interaction between QFIIs and CSR performance on access to finance. From the perspec-
tive of capital constraints, ethical stakeholder engagements lead to better access to finance as a result of more trans-
parency in disclosures regarding operations and financial position (Cheng et al., 2014).We thus expect that an increase
in CSR driven by the presence of foreign institutional investors may have an incremental effect on firms’ access to
finance. Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cheng et al. (2014), we use their regression coefficients to con-
struct a KZ index for each firm-year observation as a dependent variable. A higher value of KZ_index suggests that the
firm has more capital constraint. We then re-estimate equation (4) by replacing ROA with KZ_index and control only
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TABLE 8 The incremental effect of CSR performance on profitability and access to finance
ROA KZ_index


















Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of obs. 4,049 4,029
Adj. R-square 0.122 0.136
Notes: This table presents the incremental effects of CSRperformance driven by the presence ofQFIIswith particular focus on
operating performance,measured byROA inModel (1) and access to finance,measured byKZ_index inModel (2). Lower values
ofKZ_index corresponds to easier access to finance. SeeAppendix B for detailed variable definitions. All independent variables
are lagged by one year except QFII in Model (1). Industry and year dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm and year level and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
for firm size (Size).23 Accordingly, we expect a negative coefficient on QFII × CSR because the enhanced CSR perfor-
mance may lead to easier access to finance among firms. The result is displayed in Model 2 of Table 8. It clearly indi-
cates that the coefficient on the interaction term,QFII × CSR, is negative and, importantly, it is statistically significant,
implying that, on average, firms with QFIIs perform better at propelling CSR practices, consequently driving easier
access to finance. Collectively, the results presented in this part imply that the enhanced CSR performance driven by
the presence of foreign institutional investors leads to real consequences on business strategies, as a result of greater
operating performance and easier access to finance.
23 FollowingCheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2014),wedonot include anyother control variables except for firm size becauseKZ_index accounts for cash flows,
payout policy, leverage, and revenue growth in the derivation. Please refer to Kaplan and Zingales (1997) for details on the construction of KZ_index.
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8 CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we investigate the role of foreign institutional investors on firms’ CSR performance and reporting. Using
a panel of publicly traded firms in China between 2009 and 2017, we provide evidence that QFIIs push firms towards
high CSR engagement. In addition, we find that firms with foreign investors are more likely to comply with the GRI
guidelines, and their reports on sustainability tend to be longer. Furthermore, our results reveal that such a positive
effect is more pronounced in firms with low initial CSR performance than those with high initial CSR performance
at the time when QFIIs enter the sample, suggesting that the scope of the impact from QFIIs varies, depending on
the initial CSR level of a firm. Our finding is robust to several additional approaches, including the Granger causality
test, a firm fixed-effect model, and weighted least squares, and is insensitive to controlling for effects of cross-listing,
R&D intensity, and slack resources, as well as a sub-sample excluding firms in the manufacturing sector. Importantly,
our finding holds after endogeneity concerns are carefully addressed, based on alternative research designs, such as
propensity scorematching and the Heckman two-stage selection analysis.
We further look into the motives of QFIIs and reveal that both social awareness and geographical distance are the
driving forces behind this positive impact. In particular, we find that this positive effect is more pronounced in firms
with foreign investors domiciled in countries with high regulatory quality or from geographically remote distance. In
addition, our evidence suggests that themechanism underlying such positive effect is through the ownership ofQFIIs,
especially when the QFII is among the top ten of the largest shareholders, which provide foreign investors with suffi-
cient voting power to push firms towards stronger CSR performance. Finally, in the extended analysis, we find that the
improvement in CSR associated with the presence of QFIIs results in better operating performance and easier access
to finance.
Overall, this study offers valuable implications for policymakers in emerging markets where corporate social con-
duct practices are relatively low. Specifically, our finding suggests that foreign institutional investors, especially those
from nations with high regulatory quality, or those from geographically distant countries, may effectively help inte-
grate financial or human resources and exert a positive influence on social strategies of firms in which they invest.
Therefore, other emerging markets should consider introducing a similar QFII scheme in helping their domestic firms
to achieve higher CSR practices in accordance with international standards.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF CSR RATING SYSTEM COMPOSITION
CSR performance in
Category Code Indicator
Macrocosm M1 Overall CSR strategic objective; implementation process; risk
identification.
– Strategy M2 Impact of climate change, social issues, and change in
macroeconomic environment on corporate sustainability.
M3 Impact of products or business services on society and the
environment.
M4 Top executives’ (e.g., CEOs) or legal representatives’ (e.g.,
chairman) declarations in terms of social
responsibility/corporate sustainability.
(Continues)
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CSR performance in
Category Code Indicator
M5 Long-term and short-termCSR plans.
– Governance M6 Disclosure of firm, industry, and social environment information.
M7 CSR values and codes of conduct.
M8 Themonitoring of CSR implementation.
M9 Themanagement process in terms of corporate social, economic,
and environmental issues.
M10 Institutional settings regarding information disclosure.
M11 Assessment of sustainability-related risks.
M12 Disclosure of anti-corruption and anti-commercial bribery
information and related administrative controls.
M13 CSR promotion among affiliated enterprises and subsidiaries.
– Stakeholders M14 Stakeholder identification.
M15 Stakeholder communication; feedback from stakeholders.
M16 Review and comments from stakeholders.
Content C1 Disclosure of annual total revenues, profits, and dividend
distribution plans.
– Economic performance C2 Disclosure of percentage change in total revenues, profits, and
dividend distribution plans on a year-on-year basis.
C3 Sales volume of services and products; market share of services
and products; innovation.
– Labour and human
rights
C4 Gender structure; age distribution; total number of employees;
total number of temporary employees; formal employment
contracts.
C5 Employee training and development.
C6 Employee health and safety; protective equipment.
C7 Employee complaints and relevant solutions; declaration on the
prohibition of the use of child labour; equal pay for equal work.
C8 Employee compensation; holiday entitlement; other benefits in
addition to remuneration.
C9 Labour union; staff entertainment; family care; employee
satisfaction surveys.
C10 Employee engagement in sustainability.
– Environment C11 Annual environmental protection investments; environmental
management system.
C12 Measure, record, and report the source of contamination;
pollution control.
C13 Sustainable resources.
C14 Identify the source of greenhouse gas emission; climate change;
greenhouse gas emission reduction; reduce or avoid the adverse
effects of climate change.
– Fair operation C15 Anti-corruption policies.
(Continues)
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CSR performance in
Category Code Indicator
C16 Integrate social and environmental concerns in business
operations.
– Customers C17 Quality management certification; technological innovation in
services and products.
C18 Customer relationshipmanagement; customer satisfaction survey.
C19 The percentage of the product passing all quality requirements
without rework; product safety; recyclingmechanism.
C20 Customer complaints and related solutions.
C21 Customer privacy protection.




C23 Total social donations.
C24 Volunteer service; social contribution.
C25 Rules and regulations.
C26 Job creation and the number of employees recruited by year.
C27 Participation in technological projects; cooperation with




Technique T1 The comprehensive coverage of stakeholders’ responsibilities.
– Information coverage T2 Negative information disclosure and challenges.
– Consistency T3 Reporting activities; methodology; detailed explanations.
T4 Coverage of CSR ratings; CSR reporting; CSR ranking.
– Reporting innovation T5 Interpretation; reporting structure.
T6 Effectiveness of innovation.
– Reliability and
transparency
T7 Disclosure level of stakeholders’ suggestions.
T8 Assurance agencies.
T9 The certificate authority of the third-party agencies.
T10 Readers’ suggestions and feedback.
– Normalisation T11 The time frame of the report; coverage; information regarding
participants and producers.
– Standard T12 Standards and control groups.
– Rigorism T13 Typos.
– Information
effectiveness
T14 Multiple language versions of CSR reports.
T15 Access to CSR reports.
T16 Typesetting.
T17 Graphing.
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APPENDIX B: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Dependent variables Definitions
CSR Ameasure of the overall environmental and social performance of a firm, which consists of
three dimensions, defined under the headings ofMacrocosm, Content and Technique.
CSR_IA Industrial adjusted CSR, calculated as a firm’s overall CSR less themean value of the CSR for
all firms in the same industry in a given year.
GRI A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm discloses CSR or sustainability reports based onGlobal
Reporting Initiative guidelines, and 0 otherwise. Details are available at:
http://us.gtadata.com/ and https://database.globalreporting.org/.
Page The natural logarithm of the number of CSR or sustainability report pages.
CSRD A dummy variable set to 1 if a firm issues a CSR report and receives CSR rating in a given
year, and 0 otherwise.
Key variables
QFII A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has the shareholdings of QFIIs in a given year, and 0
otherwise.
QFII_high QFII_high is assigned a value of 1 for firmswith foreign institutional investors from a country
with high regulatory quality (equal to or above-median regulatory quality score), and 0, for
firmswithout foreign institutional investors or firmswith foreign institutional investors
from a country with low regulatory quality (below-median regulatory quality score) in a
given year.
QFII_low QFII_low is a dummy variable and receives a value of 1 for firmswith foreign institutional
investors from a country with low regulatory quality (below-median regulatory quality
score), and 0, for firmswithout foreign institutional investors or with foreign institutional
investors from a country with high regulatory quality (equal to or above-median
regulatory quality score) in a given year.
QFII_distant QFII_distant is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firmswith foreign institutional investors
from geographically distant countries (equal to or above-median physical distance), and 0,
for firmswithout foreign institutional investors or with foreign investors from
geographically close countries (below-median physical distance) in a given year. The
geographical distance is measured by the natural logarithm of the physical distance
between the capital cities of QFIIs’ countries domiciled and China.
QFII_close QFII_close is an indicator variable set to 1 for firmswith foreign institutional investors from
geographically close countries (below-median physical distance), and 0, for firmswithout
foreign institutional investors or with foreign investors from geographically distant
countries (from equal or above-median physical distance) in a given year.
QFII_own The percentage of shares owned by foreign institutional investors.
QFII_Top10 QFII_Top10 is equal to 1 if the percentage of QFII’s shareholding is greater than or equal to
that of the 10th shareholder of a firm in a given year, and 0 if it is less than that of the 10th
shareholder or if a firm does not have aQFII in the same year.
QFII_nonTop10 QFII_nonTop10 equals 1 if the percentage of QFII’s shareholding is less than that of the 10th
shareholder of a firm in a given year, and 0 if the percentage of QFII’s shareholding is
greater than or equal to that of the 10th shareholder or if a firm does not have aQFII in
the same year.
Mandatory A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is mandated to disclose a CSR report in a given year,
and 0 otherwise.
(Continues)
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Dependent variables Definitions
Control variables
State The percentage of outstanding shares held by state-related parties.
Size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets.
Age Natural logarithm of one plus the number of years since stock listing.
Lev Book value of total liabilities scaled by book value of total assets.
ROA Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) scaled by the book value of total assets.
Q Book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus themarket value of equity
scaled by the book value of total assets.
FCF The free cash flow to the firm scaled by total assets.
HERF10 Ownership concentration, measured as Herfindahl index for ownership by top ten
shareholders.
BoardSize Natural logarithm of total number of directors.
Duality Dummy variable equal to 1 for any of the following combinations: CEO and board chair are
the same person; vice-CEO and chair are the same; and/or CEO and vice-chair are the
same; and 0 otherwise.
Indep The percentage of independent directors in the boardroom.
Managerial Managerial size measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of executive
managers.
SSE A binary variable equals 1 if the firm is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and 0
otherwise. (Note: if equals 0, the firm is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.)
Cross A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm is listed onmore than one stock exchanges in a given year
and afterward, and 0 otherwise.
RDIntensity Research and development (R&D) expenditures scaled by total assets.
ExcessCash The residuals estimated from themodel used in Dittmar andMahrt-Smith (2007) and












Leveragei,t + 0.238×Qi,t .
MTB Themarket value of equity divided by the book value of equity.
SalesGrowth The annual growth of total sales.
